I was about to write a detailed blog using advanced statistics to illustrate why Belichick’s decision to go for it on 4th down tonight was absolutely the right decision. Then I realized that someone had already done it for me .

To sum it up. Belichick’s Patriots were up by six points and faced a 4th down and 2 at their own 28 yard line with just over 2:00 left in the game. Rather than punt, which just about every other coach in the league would have done (except maybe Sean Payton or Josh McDaniel), he decided to go for it.

Talking about what happened due to this decision is unimportant (and frankly painful for this Patriots fan) so I’ll focus on the decision itself. As I mentioned Brian Burke, at www.advancednflstats.com, has already done a great post on this but I’m going to sum it up here in layman’s terms and in a way that hopefully will make you realize how obvious this decision was.

Going for it on 4th and 2 at the 28 yard line is successful 60% of the time and if successful would effectively end the game. On average a punt from the 28 would net 38 yards. So a decision to punt would have to be based on an opinion that the extra 38 yards was more valuable than the opportunity to end the game 60% of the time.

Forget everything that Al Michaels and everyone is likely to say about this and think about that for a second. If you were in Belihick’s place would you rather have that 60% to end the game or that extra 38 yards in field position.

The advanced stats back up Belichick but I actually think this is a case where a seemingly counter intuitive decision is actually very straight forward. 38 yards in field position is not worth giving up a 60% opportunity to keep Peyton Manning on the sidelines.

BELICHICK MADE A GREAT DECISION

New England Coach Bill Belichick is taking a lot of heat for his decision to attempt a 4th-down conversion from his own 28 with a late 6-point lead against the Colts. Indianapolis came back to win in dramatic fashion, 35-34. Was the decision a good one?

With 2:08 left and the Colts with only one timeout, a successful 4th-and-2 conversion wins the game for all practical purposes. A conversion on 4th-and-2 would be successful 60 percent of the time. Historically, in a situation with 2:00 left and needing a TD to either win or tie, teams get the TD 53 percent of the time from that field position. The total win probability for the 4th-down conversion attempt would therefore be:

(0.60 * 1) + (0.40 * (1-0.53)) = 0.79 WP (WP stands for win probability)

A punt from the 28 typically nets 38 yards, starting the Colts at their 34. Teams historically get the TD 30 percent of the time in that situation. So the punt gives the Pats about a 0.70 WP.

Statistically, the better decision would be to go for it, and by a good amount. However, these numbers are baselines for the league as a whole. You’d have to expect the Colts had a better than 30 percent chance of scoring from their 34, and an accordingly higher chance to score from the Pats’ 28. But any adjustment in their likelihood of scoring from either field position increases the advantage of going for it. You can play with the numbers any way you like, but it’s pretty hard to come up with a realistic combination of numbers that makes punting the better option. At best, you could make it a wash.

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